
Estimated reading time: 6 minutes
The law permits agents to be remunerated in many ways. Sometimes the remuneration is by way of a one-off commission payment which excludes commission on renewal or follow-on business. But if the agent loses no future commission income when the agency agreement ends, why would a post-termination indemnity be payable under the Commercial Agents Regulations?
Given two recent German court judgments, this is a material question.
In both judgments the court decided that the agent was entitled to an indemnity irrespective of the payment of one-off commissions provided that the court could identify a compensable benefit which passed to the principal on termination.
For UK principals this may matter as the German decisions may be regarded as persuasive authority given that the Commercial Agents Regulations are to be interpreted consistently with the European Agents Directive.
For an agent to be entitled to an indemnity on termination of the agency agreement, the Regulations require:
For some time there has been a misconception that commission lost is a precondition for an indemnity. It is not. The phrase used is “in particular” – commission lost is a circumstance to which the court must have particular regard but it is not a threshold requirement. Put another way, the absence of recurring commission may affect the amount of the indemnity but it should not impact the entitlement to indemnity.
Although surprisingly whilst not mentioned in the German judgments, in 2023 the European Court confirmed in QT v O2 Czech Republic [see here] that one-off commission arrangements do not automatically exclude an indemnity claim. Now, the German judgments have addressed the question of how to calculate an indemnity where the agent loses no commission at all.
In the usual indemnity analysis, the agent’s projected commission loss serves as a proxy for the principal’s continuing benefit. But this shortcut breaks down where commission is one-off.
In both German cases, the agents ran “retail partner” shops selling mobile phone contracts. Their remuneration was a one-off closing bonus per new contract, plus a time-limited usage commission (“airtime”) at 10% of the amount charged to a customer for the first 24 months of the contract. No commission or other remuneration was payable on renewals, follow-on business, or post-termination transactions – exclusions which were upheld as valid in each judgment. The agents therefore suffered no commission loss on termination whatsoever: they would not have earned further commission on contracts sold even if their respective agencies had continued.
The conventional analysis was therefore unavailable. But the court was clear: the failure of that analysis did not mean there was nothing to calculate. It simply meant that a different method must be found.
In both cases it was decided that “substantial benefits” are not confined to revenue from repeat transactions. Benefit includes any commercial value the principal retains after termination by exploiting the customer base which the agent built, and a reduction in costs is as much a benefit as an increase in revenue.
This was important as a key feature of both cases was a “special bonus” which the principal elected unilaterally to pay to each agent in the final contract year. This was not commission for specific sales. Instead it was considered a support payment, commercially necessary to keep the agent’s retail operation afloat as the one-off commissions alone were insufficient to sustain the business while distributing a relatively new brand.
It was recognised by the German court that by terminating the agency while retaining the customer base, the principal in each case had relieved itself of the economic necessity of continuing the “special bonus” payment and as a result a measurable cost saving was produced. Further, that saving constituted an entrepreneurial benefit for the indemnity calculation. The agent had built the customer relationships that made those savings possible, and the principle underlying the concept of indemnity is to ensure that enduring commercial value does not pass to the principal uncompensated.
In both cases, the turnover post-termination from the transferred customers exceeded the “special bonus”. However, in each case the court chose the lower bonus figure as a conservative reference point for determining the indemnity.
With the base year benefit established (including the special bonus), the court applied the standard German forecasting methodology. A three-year forecast period was adopted, grounded in minimum contract terms (many mobile phone contracts had 24-month minimums, with only around 40% of customers terminating at expiry) and supported by actual post-termination attrition data. A churn (fall-off) rate of 20% per annum was applied across the forecast period, and the resulting annual benefit figures were added together and then discounted using a standard discounting formula.
The Directive requires an equitable assessment to consider commission lost by the agent, which in both cases was nil. The courts therefore applied a 70% discretionary reduction, reflecting the absence of commission lost and the lack of any meaningful brand pull effect. This was a substantial reduction and is indicative of lost commission being a strong influence on the amount of the indemnity.
The cap on the indemnity is calculated from the agent’s average annual remuneration over the five years or less preceding termination. In both cases the court included all remuneration earned during the relationship, one-off commissions, and accrued airtime, but excluded the special bonus. This was because the bonus had been deployed on the benefit side of the calculation as a proxy for what the principal gained, and as such treating it also as agent remuneration would amount to double counting.
In passing it should be mentioned that whilst this deployment of the special bonus was understandable, it is, commercially questionable. This is because, if the bonus was paid because the one-off commission structure was insufficient to sustain the agency, it is commercially indistinguishable from additional remuneration. The essence of what the agent received – the total of commissions and bonuses – is arguably what the arrangement was genuinely worth to the agent in each case. Using the bonus as a proxy for benefit to the principal whilst excluding it from the cap calculation artificially reduces the cap on the amount of the indemnity. This is a point which principals and agents in similar circumstances would be well advised to bear in mind.
The remuneration of an agent by a one-off commission structure does not prevent the agent from claiming an indemnity on termination. Where the principal continues to benefit from the customer base the agent created, it can be expected that the courts will find a way to quantify that benefit and translate it into an indemnity.
For principals using one-off commission models:
For agents paid on a one-off commission basis:




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